Borders and the Mapping of the Malay World by Trocki, Carl A.
Paper presented at the Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting,   
9-12 March 2000, San Diego, California. 
 
“Borders and the Mapping of the Malay World”  
Carl  A. Trocki     ©  2000 
 
If we wish to draw a historical border between a time in which political and 
territorial boundaries in the Malay world, and probably in all of  Southeast  Asia, were 
treated in a traditional or indigenous sense and a time when, as at present, they were 
seen in a "modern" or western  sense, it would have to be the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 
24 March 1824. This agreement, signed partly to legitimize British control of  
Singapore, and also to settle outstanding issues between the British and Dutch 
following the Napoleonic Wars, effectively divided the Malay world down the Straits 
of Melaka.  It gave the Dutch Sumatra and the islands to the south of the Straits of 
Singapore, while the British received the Malay Peninsula and Singapore Island.  
Neither power had very many actual possessions in most of these areas at the time.  
The treaty did not actually recognize possession or governance, but simply a right to 
influence, to make treaties and exercise certain responsibilities, such as supressing 
piracy.   
 
 In Article XII  of the treaty itself, the division was only vaguely defined.  The 
Dutch withdrew their objections to the British occupation of Singapore, and the 
British undertook to make no establishments on or treaties with the chiefs of  "... the 
Carimon Isles, or ... the Islands of Battam, Bintang, Lingin, or any of the other Islands 
South of the Straits of Singapore..."(Maxwell, 1924, p 11).  Graham Irwin's discussion 
of this treaty, and of its implications for Borneo, make it clear that both the Dutch and 
the British saw the division in terms of a line.  He quotes A. R. Falck, one of the 
Dutch signatories, who pointed out in a subsequent document:  "...their respective  
possessions in the East Indies are divided by a 'line of demarcation', beginning at the 
entrance of the Straits of Malacca at the parallel of Kedah (the 6th degree North 
Latitude) and terminating at the end of the Singapore Straits.   A few years later, J.C. 
Baud, the Dutch Minister for the Colonies defined the end of the Strait of Singapore 
as 1°30' N. (Irwin, 1954 p 62-4) 
 
 Although in 1824, the line was  only applied to the area of the Straits,  it is 
clear that even then, the Dutch considered the line as extending across the center of 
Southeast Asia and dividing the island of Borneo and cutting across  northern  
Sulawesi.  It thus supplied the precedent for the division of Borneo into Dutch and 
British spheres, separating Sabah and Sarawak from what is today Indonesian 
Kalimantan.  In its final form, however, the Dutch (and by virtue of that, the 
Indonesians) did better than the initial line would have suggested.  The border has 
wandered northward to include the Natuna and Anambas Islands, and then comes 
back to Borneo at Tanjong Datu and slices off Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah and ends, 
as it were on the other side of Sebatik Island off the coast of Tawau at precisely 4°10' 
N.  The latter line was arbitrarily chosen to settle a dispute between the British and 
Dutch in 1891, although it was not clearly defined until 1912. (Tregonning, 1965 , p 
23)  
 
 The year 1824 was a defining moment in the history of the region.  For the 
first time, European powers had laid down specific lines on the map and fixed them 
according to precise degrees of latitude and longitude.  It was the beginning of 
"rationalized" borders in the Malay world.  Here we see the European powers in Asia 
behaving with the rationalist arrogance of modernism characterized by Fredrick Rolfe 
whose character, Hadrian VII, boasted  “…when the Ruler of the World 
geographically rules the world, He is accustomed to do His ruling with a ruler." 
(Rolfe, 1993 , p 337)  Armed with maps, straight-edges and compasses a few men 
who had never been to the Straits of Melaka sat in a room in London and divided up 
the island world of Southeast Asia. 
 
The location of this line, not only constitutes the current border between 
Malaysia and Indonesia and Singapore, but also connects with the borders between 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.  Such a border was not only unprecedented 
according to Southeast Asian reckoning, but also arbitrarily divided  bodies of water 
and groups of islands which had heretofore been borderless and in fact, which had 
formerly been the united political territories.  These included the ancient kingdom of 
Johor-Riau, the successor to the Ur-Malay principality of Melaka in the west; and 
Brunei and Sulu in the east.  Both Johor-Riau and Sulu were roughly split down the 
middle and Brunei was mibbled down to a sliver of its former self.  For all practical 
purposes Johor-Riau, in particular, had virtually ceased to exist, at least in the minds 
of Europeans.   Although it would be many years before the line actually came to 
function as a border in the European sense, the division was enough to abrogate the 
indigenous political dynamics that had operated in the region for centuries.  
 
Pre-Colonial Borders 
 Prior to the nineteenth century, the Malay world was still governed largely by 
the indigenous political cultures of the past.   Malay "states", where they existed were 
often merely collections of thinly-populated centers at river mouths, held together  
through trade, kinship; shared ceremonial or religious practices;  various forms of 
clientship and dependency; violence and intimidation; and possibly language.  These 
polities included,  not only Johor-Riau, but also Sulu, Brunei, Palembang-Jambi, Siak, 
Mindanao, Pontianak, Sambas, Aceh, the states of the Malay Peninsula and many 
other principalities of the island world of Southeast Asia.  They were representative of 
what Jaya Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers have called the port-polities of 
Southeast Asia. (Kathirithamby-Wells, 1990 )  I argue that this particular form of state 
seems to have been unique to island Southeast Asia. (Trocki, 1992 #244)   Others, 
such as O.W.Wolters and Pierre-Yves Manguin, have made similar observations. 
(Manguin, 1993 ; Wolters, 1999 )  Wolters has gone so far as to suggest that such 
states were “borderless”.   I would hasten to interject that this did not mean that rulers 
did not recognize distinctions between territories that were “theirs” and those that 
were beyond their control.  On the other hand, the very concept of borders, seen as 
lines dividing one state from another, did not really exist in the region.   
 
 To European observers, these territories, or multi-centered states often seemed 
ephemeral, and with some justification.  For instance, in 1512, the great polity of 
Melaka seemed to disintegrate almost completely once the Portuguese took the city.  
Its successor, Johor-Riau seemed to flicker like a poorly-wired light bulb for the next 
three centuries as it clung to the lower end of the Melaka Straits (Andaya, 1978 )  
States like Aceh rose in the seventeenth century and collapsed in the eighteenth.  
Brunei, an important center in the sixteenth and seventeenth century had declined 
sharply in the eighteenth.  The same might be said of  Maguindanao.  Its place was 
taken by Sulu in the eighteenth century,  a state seen by Europeans as a piratical 
upstart. (Warren, 1981)  Similar periods of fluorescence and decay were evidenced in 
Palembang and Jambi as Barbara Andaya has demonstrated. (Andaya, 1993 )  
Although Europeans attempted to represent such polities on their maps, it seems clear 
that the resident Southeast Asians, did not see them the same way.   
 
 At  any given time, these territories varied in both shape and structure, 
including islands, river mouths, stretches of coastline, shoals, reefs, and parts of the 
surface of the sea.  More important than territory, however, was the influence 
exercised over the peoples who lived in the subject areas, as well as the ability to 
demand their services and  to tap the economic resources that they controlled.  Also, 
significant were relations of dependency that might exist between the chiefs of 
subordinate centers and more powerful patrons in the dominant centers.  Such states 
tended  to overlap, and expand and contract, concertina-like over time.   There could, 
at any time, be hundreds of nautical miles of open sea between the components of 
such polities.  These considerations rarely appeared on European maps, and when 
these states were represented on European maps, they often took on a false aspect, 
which presumed a solidity, and connectedness that did not exist.   
 The basic unit of maritime Malay political structure seems to have been the 
negri.  This was the seat of a chief, perhaps a Sultan, perhaps only a raja or pengulu, 
depending on the size and importance of the polity.  With luck, he controlled the ulu, 
or upriver area, mainly by physically blocking access to the region on the river.  With 
even more luck, he might even control some of the seacoast on either side of the river 
mouth.  Between one negri and another, there was often a vast expanse of forest, 
swamp and sea.  This was sparsely inhabited by “tribal” peoples, hunter-gatherers, 
orang laut, swidden farmers and even wet-rice growing peasants, most of whom were 
in some sort of dependency relationship with a nearby chief or raja. 
 As maritime states, Malay negri tended to be bound together by water rather 
than separated.  Rivers and straits tended to be the core of states and were rarely the 
edges.  These were, in the words of Pierre-Yves Manguin, “ship-shape societies”, 
built around boats and water-borne communications.   They were made up of royal 
residences, ports, markets, foreign traders, outlaws, pirates, navies and maritime as 
well as land-based gatherers and collectors.   Large maritime states probably 
resembled Tambiah’s “galactic polity”, being organized, at least, conceptually, by 
those at the center, as grouped in mandalas, or rings.  Within these far-flung centres, 
traders and raiders, both indigenous and foreign seemed to roam at will. 
The systems of land-management, particularly for agriculture, that were seen 
as fundamental to European administrative establishments, were largely absent in the 
cultural repertoire of the maritime Malays.  The idea of drawing lines around bits of 
territory, or of dividing one ruler’s sphere from another by means of a line, to say 
nothing of drawing a line through the middle of the sea, seem to have been foreign 
concepts at the beginning of the nineteenth century in this part of the world.  
 Nonetheless, it is clear that even Malay rulers, whose experience may have 
been little more than seafaring, were quite capable developing certain forms of land 
management.  Moreover, at bottom, there was always the ability to manage a piece of 
land from the seacoast or by means of its riverine access.  And, since riverine access 
was the key to land, then the river valley bounded by its natural watersheds was seen 
as the general unit of land division.   
 
 The example of the rulers of Johor in the nineteenth century is a case in point.  
After 1840, as the Temenggong of Johor took possession and control of the territory 
that today makes up the state of Johor, he systematically divided the state by river 
valleys.  This was the foundation of the kangchu system, by which the state was 
parcelled out to Chinese pepper and gambier planters from Singapore. The term 
“kangchu” is a Chinese term which translates as “lord of the port”, or more 
appropriately, riverbank landing. In the second half of the nineteenth century, as the 
state became more densely settled, some of the larger rivers were divided by the 
giving one kangchu the left bank and another the right. (Trocki, 1976 ; Trocki, 1979 )  
Undoubtedly, this system of territorial management owed something to traditional 
Malay administrative culture.  
We get another view of this sort of division-by-watershed in the memoir of 
Mohamed Ibrahim bin Abdullah, the son of the well-known Munshi Abdullah who 
had served as Raffles’ scribe in the early nineteenth century.  In 1871, Md. Ibrahim 
then an official in the Johor government, accompanied Engku Abdul Rahman, the 
ruler’s brother, to settle some disputes among Chinese tin-miners at Bukit Mor, not far 
from Muar.  He offers a short dissertation on the rationale for parcelling out the 
riverbanks and “rivermouth” areas of these small creeks running off of the hillside. 
(Mohamed Ibrahim, 1975 ,  pp 22-24) 
 
 What I have described as rivers are not like most rivers, big and deep and 
flowing into the sea, but are merely creeks or rivulets.  Every stream 
invariably flows to low ground or a swamp (kuala), and always runs between 
two hills, and rises on a hill.  Whenever a stream flows down from a hill, 
passes between hills and reaches a swamp, it ceases to flow and empties itself 
there.  This point is called its mouth, and outlets of this sort always have hills 
to the left and right of them.  It has been decided that the limits of a river-
mouth are where the hills on either side come to an end.  It has also been 
decided where the boundaries of the rivers are, and that each river shall be 
owned by one towkay.  Each river shall extend from the farthest point 
upstream to the mouth, excluding the hill in which it rises.  The width shall be 
300 feet from the river-bank to the left and right, and no more.  If there is 
another river or stream nearby, then the boundary must be half-way between 
the two.  The boundaries of a swamp must not go beyond the foot of the hills 
on either side of it nor must its length exceed 1,800 feet square. (Mohamed 
Ibrahim, 1975, p 23) 
  
In general, we can probably conclude that for nineteenth century Malays, hilltops and 
watersheds were the keys of land division.  On the whole, these were not lines on a 
map, but tended to be rather remote and thinly populated zones, where travel was 
slow and difficult and the rule of the raja was rarely exercised with much effect.   
 It is worth noting that, despite British and Dutch expectations about the1824 
line in Borneo, the actual extension of it was, to a great extent, done by neither power.  
The British adventurer and empire builder, James Brooke, who carved out the state of 
Sarawak from the holdings of Brunei, was largely responsible for the final border 
between British and Dutch spheres.  One of the big differences in the line that Brooke 
drew was that it did follow the watersheds.   Brooke, of course, was actually there on 
the spot, and in a series of treaties with the Brunei ruler over about three decades, he 
successively annexed one river valley after another.  In each case, the decision was 
made by individuals on the spot, and who were engaged in the dynamics of local 
political-military situations.  It is also clear from the treaties which he and his agents 
signed with the rulers of Brunei and other chiefs, that the cessions were generally 
made in terms of “states” or “districts” or “provinces” which were already seen to 
exist prior to the cession.  These territories apparently already had defined boundaries 
so far as the local rulers were concerned. 
 
 By way of example, in the 1853 treaty giving Brooke the district of Sarawak, 
the area is described as “…the district of Sarawak, and its outlying territories, 
extending from Cape Datu to the mouth of the River Samarahan,…” (Maxwell, 1924  
p 187)  In the 1855 treaty, Brooke received the right to collect taxes from seven more 
“districts”:  “firstly Rajang; secondly Kalaka; thirdly Serebas; fourthly Lingga; fifthly 
Sakarang; sixthly Sadong; seventhly Samarahan…” (Maxwell, 1924 p188)  In most 
cases, it appears that the districts were seen as river valleys.  In other cessions to 
Sarawak or to the British North Borneo Company, river valleys seemed to be the 
general limitation of a district.  When the cessions were described in terms of 
coastlines, then headlands and river mouths were often taken as the operative 
boundaries.  The 1877 treaty between Brunei and the British North Borneo Company, 
reads: 
…all the territory and land belonging to the Sultan on the West Coast of 
Borneo comprising Gaya Bay from Gaya Head to Loutut Point including 
Sapangar Bay and Gaya Bay, and Sapangar Island and Gaya Island and all the 
other islands within the limits of the harbour and within three marine leagues 
of the coast, likewise the province and territory of Pappar adjoining the 
Province of Benoni and belonging to His Highness as his private 
property…(Maxwell, 1924  p154) 
 
The other treaty, done the same day, for the east Coast, reads similarly and “…assigns 
all the following territories belonging to the kingdom of Brunei and comprising the 
States of Paitan, Sugut, Bangaya, Labuk, Sandakan, Kina Batangan, Mumian and all 
the territories as far as the Sibuco River with all the islands within three leagues of the 
coast…” (Maxwell, 1924, p 155).  Here the territories are actually called “states” in 
the English-language version of the treaty.  It would be interesting to know what word 
was used in the Malay version. 
 
Borders and Stateless Peoples 
Perhaps the lesson that might emerge from these examples is that borders 
made on the spot are not usually made as straight lines, but whether that made them 
any more suitable, or palatable to the local residents is questionable.  In the case of 
Sarawak we find ourselves in the midst of other problems.  Sarawak and British North 
Borneo (Sabah) came into being as a result of the dealings of Brooke, Overbeck and 
Dent with Brunei. These can be seen as matters occurring between states, or at least 
governments.  And, as James Scott tells us, borders are part of seeing like a state, the 
state’s vision may not coincide with that of the inhabitants.   While Sarawak and 
Sabah became new states made from territory that was separated from the state of 
Brunei, (and from Sulu in the case of Sabah) the populations of the new states were 
not consulted and were not exactly prepared to discover that they now “belonged” to a 
state, which was invested … 
…with the power of life and death over the inhabitants with all the absolute 
rights of property vested in us over the soil of the Country and the right to 
dispose of the same as well as the rights over the productions of the country 
whether mineral vegetable or animal with the rights of making laws coining 
money creating an army and navy levying customs rates on home and foreign 
trade and shipping and other dues and taxes on the inhabitants as to him may 
seem good or expedient together with all other powers and rights usually 
exercised by and belonging to sovereign rulers…(Maxwell, 1924, p 157)  
 
 Whatever the treaty said, however, in these areas, away from the coasts, 
behind the ranges, in the ulu, the dynamics of the port-polity broke down.  It is 
probable that peoples such as the Kayan, the Kenyah, the Kelabit, the Murut, the 
Kadazan, Penan and others also observed the natural boundaries of watersheds and the 
significance of riverine access. Despite this, their borders, where they existed, were 
matters of long-standing negotiation and conflict between themselves and their 
immediate neighbors, and none of these were states. The absence of large-scale 
polities in the rain forests, and more distant archipelagos of the Malay world did not 
prevent the indigenous peoples of these regions from marking out their own divisions 
and laying claim to useful bits of territory and specific features of the landscape that 
might have ritual or economic importance.  Such things as durian groves, camphor 
trees, bird’s nest caves, would all be considered to be the exclusive property of certain 
individuals, families or villages whose right to exploit  the resources in question 
would be generally recognized by others in the area.  Likewise, as resources, they 
could also be the focus of disputes between neighbors.  People certainly 
acknowledged that such things as property rights existed, but the right usually 
involved usage of a particular item, and did not fall within the ownership of one or 
another party because of a line on a map or because of the specific land on which it 
was located.  For other groups, particularly wet rice farmers, such as the Kelabit of the 
upper Baram or the peoples now known as the Kadazan in Sabah’s west coast interior  
(e.g. Penampang, Tambunan, Keninggau and Tenom) terraced rice fields were 
certainly owned and were demarcated by lines.  Moreover, control over watersheds 
and water supplies was closely monitored and highly regulated.    
 In the case of sea peoples or sea nomads, such as the Bajau Laut of Semporna, 
their ideas of borders and property were even less restrictive.  Clifford Sather notes 
that “Within the district, individual fishing sites are unowned.  Neither the village nor 
its separate families limit access to these sites or exclude others from making use of 
them.” (Sather, 1997, p 106)  Priority rights, however, were maintained here.  
Whoever set up his nets first was allowed to continue fishing undisturbed and 
latecomers were expected to avoid fishing in the same area.  Continued use of a site, 
and this included the maintenance of  kelongs, fish-traps and other stationary or 
temporary devices, kept the area reserved to the first-comer.   These conventions were 
entirely ignored by the colonial governments that took control of the region and 
neither have they been recognized by the successor states of the Philippines, Indonesia 
or Malaysia.   
This is a topic that Sather barely addresses. He is almost entirely silent on the 
question of the border between Sabah and the Philippines, and for that matter, 
Indonesian Borneo.  This perhaps reflects the attitude of the Sama Dilaut peoples 
whom Sather studied, who seemed to live then as if the imaginary line, which 
separated the peoples of Tawi-Tawi and Sibutu from those of Bangau-Bangau and 
Sitankai, did not exist.  They were not, however, ignorant of the line, and indeed 
realized the potential for profit that it represented.   In the 1960s and 1970s, the area 
was an important cigarette-smuggling location.  The Sabah government freely 
permitted the import of American and British cigarettes and collected only a nominal 
duty.  By contrast the Philippine government, trying to protect a local tobacco 
industry and raise a revenue, placed an exorbitant tax on foreign cigarettes.  The 
existence of the border and the differential taxation regimes on either side of it created 
a situation ideally suited to the sea peoples of the region, who were distant enough 
from the capitals of Manila and Kuala Lumpur to flaunt their pretensions with 
impunity for a long time. 
 
Violating the Colonial Borders 
The question of smuggling along and across the Malay-Singapore-Indonesian 
border is a topic that has been given considerable attention by Eric Tagliacozzo in his 
recent Ph.D. thesis, “Secret Trades of the Straits” (Tagliacozzo, 1999).  Tagliacozzo, 
has shown that the realization of the border between the Malay Peninsula, Singapore 
Island and Sumatra and the Riau-Lingga Archipelago was really a century-long 
project for both the British and the Dutch.  It was obviously not enough for the rulers 
to rule with their rulers.  They had to do more.  He describes a process of mapping, 
exploring, negotiating, cataloging, classifying, collecting, taxing, policing and 
administering the borders that divided British Malaya from the Dutch East Indies.  
And, even with those activities, perhaps in spite of them, perhaps even because of 
them, the local inhabitants and others persisted in smuggling opium, guns, slaves and 
other forms of contraband across the imaginary lines. (Tagliacozzo, 1999)   
Tagliacozzo spends little time discussing the pre-colonial borders, or lack 
thereof in the region.  He is more interested in the violation of the border as a 
“modern” occupation.  The opium and arms smugglers saw the border as a site of 
opportunity for gain within the colonial construct.  Thus, the free trade and relatively 
open economy of the British possessions allowed goods and commodities to circulate 
freely in the Straits of Melaka and around the Borneo coast.  The fact that these very 
same goods were contraband on the other side of the imaginary line, and thus 
desirable, often because they were forbidden, or forbidden because they were 
desirable, was a windfall to traders.  It should be understood, as well, that these 
traders were not always traditional Malays who had as yet failed to become border-
conscious, rather they were among the wealthiest and most influential and “respected” 
of Chinese and Southeast Asian traders, and often were the very ones entrusted with 
the maintenance of the border. (Tagliacozzo, 1999, Ch.5) 
 
At the same time, the Malay rulers of the region, particularly those of Johor, 
Riau and Aceh, quickly came to understand the significance that borders now gave 
them in their positions.  (Tagliacozzo, 1999, p 68)   They too saw possibilities for 
profit and self-aggrandizement in the new international constructs around them.  In 
the early 1860s the young ruler of  Johor, Abu Bakar, sought to claim a greater share 
of the revenues produced by the Chinese pepper and gambier planters who were 
moving into his state from Singapore.  His understanding that he was the ruler of a 
sovereign state separated from Singapore by a line running through the Johor Strait 
was the basis for his enacting a set of regulations which would have required trading 
boats from Singapore to stop at his new port of Tanjong Putri (now Johor Bahru).  
The British in Singapore retaliated with the claim that the 1824 treaty with Abu 
Bakar’s predecessor gave them a claim on all waters within ten miles of the Singapore 
shoreline.  Abu Bakar successfully challenged the British claim by appealing to 
international law, which placed the border at the midway point in the straits.  
Although he was ultimately forced to relax his Tanjong Putri regulations, he had 
successfully met the Europeans on their own border, as it were. (Turnbull, 1959; 
Trocki, 1979 ) 
Both the rulers and the revenue farmers of Riau and Johor quickly appreciated 
that the value of their revenue farms were greatly enhanced by their proximity to 
Singapore, just on the other side of very porous borders.  It was clear to the opium 
farmers of Singapore, the wealthiest and most respectable of all Chinese merchants in 
the colony, that they could grow immensely wealthier by acquiring the opium farms 
of Johor or Riau.  These territories made ideal bases from which to surreptitiously 
move contraband opium into Singapore.  The Chinese tax farmers were able to do this 
at virtually no risk or exposure to themselves.  They only needed to manufacture 
smokeable opium (chandu) in, say Tanjong Pinang in Riau, and offer it for sale at a 
rate some ten or twenty percent below the Singapore price, and they would be flooded 
with eager customers who would be willing to undertake the risk of moving the 
chandu into Singapore. (Trocki, 1990) 
The border in the Straits of Melaka continued to be the site of an active 
smuggling trade throughout the twentieth century.  The long coastline and the fringing 
mangrove swamps has, over the centuries, provided shelter for entire navies of 
smugglers and pirates.  During the Indonesian revolution, an active arms trade sprung 
up once again, with Sumatran patriots trading the produce of the plantations for 
weapons and supplies to assist them in their struggle against the Dutch.  The 
restrictive trade policies put into place by the Sukarno government after independence 
created a continued reason for the illicit export of Sumatran produce.  In Singapore 
and Penang, such goods were received as part of the “barter trade” that existed 
between Singapore/Malaya/Malaysia and Indonesia.  Cloth, guns and manufactured 
goods returned across the Straits from the free ports on the Malaysia/Singapore side 
and surreptitiously passed the customs stations on the Indonesian side.   Similar trades 
were carried on by Buginese barter traders between East Kalimantan and Sulawesi 
and the east coast of Sabah.   Indeed, in many respects and in more modern mediums 
of communication and transport, such trades continue to exist.  By far the most 
pervasive forms of modern smuggling, and the piracy that often accompanies it, seem 
to have been carried out by the agents of the very states that attempt to enforce these 
borders.  It is no secret that the most active smugglers in the Straits of Melaka today 
are agents of Indonesian military commanders in the region. 
 
Perhaps because the borders were created by Europeans, perhaps because there 
was so little involvement of local peoples in their construction, we might easily blame 
the difficulties resulting from these borders on colonialism.   On the other hand, it is 
probable that even without colonialism – if that is a possible reconstruction of the past 
– states would have come into being in Southeast Asia and those states would have 
had borders like other states in the world.  Nevertheless, the possibility that borders in 
the Malay world have been so peculiarly arbitrary and the fact of very different 
historical precedents in the region have made them all the more problematic today.   It 
is clear, however, that the bordered territories which have emerged from these 
colonial projects have been fully embraced by the succeeding national states.  
Territory is no longer simple “real estate”, but once inside the national border, it 
becomes part of the indivisible and sacred unity of the nation, a pusaka, or treasured 
inheritance which can only be divided at the cost of unthinkable terror and violence, 
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